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1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a growing use of iterative auctions for sell-
ing items such as spectrum licenses in telecommunication, electrical power,
landing slots at airports, etc. (see [8, 9] for surveys). In such auctions, given
a set of discrete (or indivisible) items the auctioneer aims at nding an e-
cient allocation of items to bidders as well as market clearing prices of the
items.
In this paper, we consider a model where there are multiple indivisible
goods for sale and each good may have several units; this is more general
than the single-unit model treated extensively in the literature (see, e.g.,
[13, 14, 15, 17, 31]). We are particularly interested in precise time bounds
of iterative auctions. Theoretical bounds on the number of iterations are
interesting in their own right but also important in practice, providing mar-
ket participants with an a priori guarantee for the time required to execute
a planned auction. While computer simulations are often used to evaluate
the practical performance of iterative auctions (see, e.g., [6, 27]), there are
only a few scattered results on theoretical analysis of the time complexity
so far (see, e.g., [3, 28]).
The objective of this paper is to provide a unied method of analysis
for iterative auctions based on the theory of discrete convex analysis. Our
contribution consists of the following two aspects.
In the multi-unit auction model with (strong) gross substitutes valua-
tions, Ausubel [4] proposed several iterative auctions, all of which are based
on minimization of a function called the Lyapunov function. Our rst contri-
bution is to reveal a nice combinatorial property of the Lyapunov function|
discrete convexity (L\-convexity), and analyze the number of iterations re-
quired in iterative auctions by utilizing the theory of discrete convex anal-
ysis. L\-convexity of the Lyapunov function is shown by using the discrete
conjugacy theorem in discrete convex analysis and the equivalence between
the (strong) gross substitutes condition and some discrete concavity (M\-
concavity) due to Fujishige and Yang [12] and Murota and Tamura [26] (see
Section 4.1). We give the exact bounds for the ascending and descending
auctions in [4] and their variants in terms of the `1-distance between the
initial price vector and the equilibrium price vector (see Theorems 4.7, 4.8,
4.10, and 4.11). This implies, in particular, that the trajectory of the price
vector generated by the ascending or descending auction is the \shortest"
path between the initial vector and the equilibrium price vector. This result
also exhibits an appealing feature of the ascending and descending auctions.
Another iterative auction named the two-phase auction, consisting of a sin-
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gle ascending phase and a single descending phase, is also considered in this
paper (see Theorems 4.12 and 4.13 and Remark 4.14).
Our second contribution is concerned with the unit-demand auction
model in the sense that each bidder is interested in getting at most one
item. Iterative auctions for this model are discussed extensively in the lit-
erature (see, e.g., [2, 3, 10, 18, 19, 28]). Specically, Vickrey{English auc-
tion by Demange et al. [10], Vickrey{Dutch auction by Mishra and Parkes
[18], and Vickrey{English{Dutch auction by Andersson and Erlanson [3]
are such iterative auctions. These three algorithms are proposed indepen-
dently of the iterative auction algorithms for the multi-unit model. We
oer a unied treatment of these iterative auction algorithms by revealing
their relationship to the general iterative auction algorithms for the general
model. In particular, we show that the sequence of price vectors generated
by Vickrey{English auction (resp., Vickrey{Dutch auction) coincides with
that generated by an ascending auction algorithm (resp., a descending auc-
tion algorithm) when applied to unit-demand auctions. This observation,
combined with our rst contribution described above, yields immediately the
known bounds for the number of iterations in Vickrey{English auction and
Vickrey{Dutch auction. A new bound for Vickrey{English{Dutch auction
is obtained from our result for the two-phase auction algorithm above.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we explain
auction models and fundamental concepts used in this paper. In Section 3
we review the concept of discrete convexity and some fundamental results in
discrete convex analysis. In Section 4, we analyze the number of iterations
required in iterative auctions in the multi-unit model with gross substitutes
valuations, while iterative auction algorithms for the unit-demand auctions
are discussed in Section 5.
This paper is the full version of our extended abstract [25] that appeared
in the conference proceedings of ISAAC 2013, with a substantial extension
described in Section 5.
2. Fundamental Concepts in Auctions
We explain auction models and fundamental concepts used in this paper.
2.1. Auction Models and Walrasian Equilibrium.
In the auction market, there are n types of items or goods, denoted by
N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, andm bidders, denoted byM = f1; 2; : : : ;mg, wherem 
2. We have u(i) units available for each item i 2 N , where u(i) is a positive
integer. We denote the integer interval as [0; u]Z = fx 2 Zn j 0  x  ug,
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Figure 1: Relationship among three auction models.
where u = (u(1); u(2); : : : ; u(n))>. Each vector x 2 [0; u]Z is called a bundle;
a bundle x = (x(1); x(2); : : : ; x(n))> corresponds to a (multi-)set of items,
where x(i) represents the multiplicity of item i 2 N . Each bidder j 2 M
has his valuation function fj : [0; u]Z ! R; the number fj(x) represents
the value of the bundle x worth to bidder j. The case with u(i) = 1 for
all i 2 N is referred to as single-unit auction in this paper, while the case
with general u as multi-unit auction. Note that [0;1]Z = f0; 1gn, where
1 = (1; 1; : : : ; 1)>. A further special case where each bidder is interested in
getting at most one item is called unit-demand auction; see Section 5 for
more detailed description of this auction model. The relationship among
the three auction models is summarized in Figure 1.
In an auction, we want to nd an ecient allocation and market clearing
prices. An allocation of items is dened as a set of bundles x1; x2; : : : ; xm 2
[0; u]Z satisfying
Pm
j=1 xj = u. Given a price vector p 2 Rn+, each bidder
j 2 M wants to have a bundle x which maximizes the value fj(x)   p>x.
For j 2M and p 2 Rn+, dene
Vj(p) = maxffj(x)  p>x j x 2 [0; u]Zg; (2.1)
Dj(p) = argmaxffj(x)  p>x j x 2 [0; u]Zg: (2.2)
We call the function Vj : Rn+ ! R and the set Dj(p)  [0; u]Z the indirect
utility function and the demand set, respectively. The auctioneer wants to
nd a pair of a price vector p and an allocation x1; x2; : : : ; xm such that
xj 2 Dj(p) for j 2 M . This pair is called a (Walrasian) equilibrium; p
is a (Walrasian) equilibrium price vector (see, e.g., [8, 9]). Thus, in an
equilibrium every bidder gets an optimal bundle for himself and all goods
are sold; i.e., all market participants are in harmony.
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Although the Walrasian equilibrium possesses a variety of desirable prop-
erties, it does not always exist. Hence, some assumption for bidders' valua-
tion functions is required to guarantee the existence of a Walrasian equilib-
rium.
Remark 2.1. Two dierent denitions of Walrasian equilibrium can be
found in the literature. The denition in this paper follows the one in [4]. An
alternative denition, in which unsold items may exist, is as follows (cf. [13,
Section 3]): a pair of a price vector p and a set of bundles ~x1; : : : ; ~xm is
called a (Walrasian) equilibrium if it satises the following condition:Pm
j=1 ~xj  u;
~xj 2 Dj(p) for all j 2M;
p(i) = 0 for all i 2 N with Pmj=1 ~xj(i) < u(i):
9=; (2.3)
The two denitions of equilibrium are essentially equivalent in the sense
that the set of equilibrium price vectors remains the same under the two
denitions, provided that valuation functions fj (j 2M) are nondecreasing
(see, e.g., [13, Section 3]). Indeed, it is easy to see that if a pair of a price
vector p and an allocation x1; x2; : : : ; xm is an equilibrium in our sense,
then the pair also satises the condition (2.3). Conversely, if a pair of a
price vector p and a set of bundles ~x1; : : : ; ~xm satises the condition (2.3),
the allocation x1; x2; : : : ; xm given by
xj = ~xj (j = 1; 2; : : : ;m  1); xm = u 
m 1X
j=1
~xj
satises xj 2 Dj(p) for j = 1; 2; : : : ;m; note that xm 2 Dm(p) follows from
the condition (2.3) and the fact that valuation function fm is nondecreasing.
Hence, the pair of the price vector p and the allocation ~x1; ~x2; : : : ; ~xm is an
equilibrium in our sense.
2.2. Gross Substitutes Condition and Discrete Concavity.
We say that function fj satises the gross substitutes (GS) condition if
it satises the following:
(GS) 8p; q 2 Rn+ with p  q; 8x 2 Dj(p); 9y 2 Dj(q) :
x(i)  y(i) (8i 2 N with p(i) = q(i)):
This condition means that when prices of some items increase, the only items
that may drop from the optimal bundle are those with increased prices.
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The GS condition is originally introduced by Kelso and Crawford [15] for
valuation functions dened on 0-1 vectors in the setting of a fairly general
two-sided job matching model. Since then, this condition has been widely
used in various models such as matching, housing, and labor markets (see,
e.g., [4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16]).
Various characterizations of GS condition are given in the literature of
discrete convex analysis and auction theory [5, 12, 13, 14]. Among others,
Fujishige and Yang [12] revealed the relationship between GS condition and
discrete concavity called M\-concavity (see Section 3.1 for the denition).
The concept of M\-concave function is introduced by Murota and Shioura
[23], independently of GS condition, as a class of discrete concave functions.
It is an extension of the concept of M-concave function introduced by Murota
[20]. The concepts of M\-concavity/M-concavity play primary roles in the
theory of discrete convex analysis [21].
It is shown by Fujishige and Yang [12] that GS condition and M\-
concavity are equivalent in the case of single-unit auction.
Theorem 2.2 (Fujishige and Yang [12]). A valuation function f : f0; 1gn !
R dened on 0-1 vectors satises the GS condition if and only if it is an M\-
concave function.
This result initiated a strong interaction between discrete convex analysis
and auction theory; the results obtained in discrete convex analysis are used
in auction theory ([7, 16], etc.), while auction theory provides discrete convex
analysis with interesting applications (see, e.g., [26]).
It is known that in single-unit auctions, a Walrasian equilibrium does
exist if bidder's valuation functions satisfy the GS condition. The GS con-
dition, however, is not sucient for the existence of an equilibrium in multi-
unit auctions. In the last decade, several papers independently tried to
identify conditions for valuation functions to guarantee the existence of an
equilibrium in a multi-unit auction. Murota and Tamura [26] proposed a
stronger version of GS condition by using the relationship with M\-concavity,
and proved the existence of an equilibrium in a more general setting (see
also [21, Chapter 11]).
In this paper, we use the strong gross substitutes (SGS) condition given
by Milgrom and Strulovici [17] (see also [29, Section 4]). We say that a
valuation function satises the SGS condition if the function satises the
GS condition when each unit of items is regarded as being distinct. More
precisely, for a valuation function f : [0; u]Z ! R, we associate a function
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~f : f0; 1g ~N ! R by considering
~N = f(i; ) j i 2 N; 1    u(i)g
and dening ~f(~x) for ~x 2 f0; 1g ~N by
~f(~x) = f(x); where x(i) =
u(i)X
=1
~x(i; ) (i 2 N): (2.4)
Then, by denition, f satises the SGS condition if and only if ~f satises the
GS condition. The SGS condition turns out to be equivalent to M\-concavity
(see Theorem 4.1 below) and also to the condition given by Murota and
Tamura [26].
Throughout this paper we assume the following conditions for all bidders'
valuation functions fj (j = 1; 2; : : : ;m) dened on [0; u]Z:
(A0) fj is monotone nondecreasing,
(A1) fj satises the SGS condition,
(A2) fj takes integer values.
The assumption (A2) can be removed if we only need an "-approximate
equilibrium price vector, which is dened, for " > 0, as a vector p such that
kp  pk1 < " for some equilibrium price vector p. For such a problem, all
results in this paper can be adapted easily with slight modications.
2.3. Iterative Auctions.
An auction algorithm called the iterative auction (or Walrasian ta^tonnement
process, price adjustment process, dynamic auction, etc.) is studied exten-
sively in the auction literature [8, 9]. An iterative auction nds an equi-
librium price vector by iteratively updating a current price vector p using
information on demand sets Dj(p).
The most natural and popular iterative auction is ascending auction, in
which the current price vector is increased monotonically. Ascending auc-
tion is a natural generalization of the classical English auction for a single
item; in addition, it is natural from the economic point of view, and easy
to understand and implement. For single-unit auctions with GS valuation
functions, an ascending auction of Gul and Stacchetti [14] can nd an equi-
librium price vector.
Ausubel [4] featured the Lyapunov function, which is dened by
L(p) =
mX
j=1
Vj(p) + u
>p (p 2 Rn); (2.5)
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where the vector u 2 Zn+ represents the numbers of available units for items
in N . Use of the Lyapunov function is motivated by the fact that the set of
excess supply vectors at a price vector p (i.e., the set fu  Pmj=1 xj j xj 2
Dj(p)g) coincides with the set of subgradients of the Lyapunov function at
p. The following important properties of the Lyapunov function are known
(see [4, 30]).
Theorem 2.3. Suppose that all bidders' valuation functions fj (j = 1; 2; : : : ;m)
dened on [0; u]Z satisfy the conditions (A0) and (A1).
(i) A price vector p 2 Rn is an equilibrium price vector if and only if it is a
minimizer of the Lyapunov function L.
(ii) The minimal equilibrium price vector p and the maximal equilibrium
price vector p are uniquely determined. Moreover, if the valuation func-
tions fj are integer-valued (i.e., satisfy (A2)), then p
 and p are integral,
i.e., p; p 2 Zn.
The ascending auction algorithm in Ausubel [4], which is a reformulation
of the ascending auction by Gul and Stacchetti [14], nds the minimal inte-
gral minimizer p of the Lyapunov function in a nite number of iterations
by updating the price vector in a greedy manner (see Section 4.2 for details).
Ausubel [4] also proposed a descending auction algorithm, which nds the
maximal integral minimizer p of the Lyapunov function by iteratively de-
creasing the price vector from an initial price vector. While the ascending
and descending auction algorithms have various nice properties (see, e.g.,
[8, 9]), they have a disadvantage that the initial price vector must be a
lower (or upper) bound of the equilibrium price vector p (or p). Ausubel
[4] proposed a third iterative auction, named \global Walrasian ta^tonnement
algorithm," which can start with an arbitrary price vector.
3. Preliminaries from Discrete Convex Analysis
We review the concepts of M\-concave and L\-convex functions and
present some useful properties. See [21] for more account of these concepts.
3.1. Denitions and Conjugacy.
A valuation function fj : [0; u]Z ! R is said to be M\-concave (read
\M-natural-concave") if it satises the following:
(M\-EXC) 8x; y 2 [0; u]Z; 8i 2 supp+(x  y); 9k 2 supp (x  y) [ f0g :
fj(x) + fj(y)  fj(x  i + k) + fj(y + i   k):
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Here, we denote
supp+(x) = fi 2 N j x(i) > 0g; supp (x) = fi 2 N j x(i) < 0g
for a vector x 2 Rn, i 2 f0; 1gn is the characteristic vector of i 2 N (i.e.,
the i-th unit vector), and 0 = 0 = (0; 0; : : : ; 0)
>.
Let g : Rn ! R [ f+1g be a polyhedral convex function, i.e., a convex
function such that the epigraph f(p; ) j p 2 Rn;  2 R; g(p)  g is a
polyhedron. We denote
dom g = fp 2 Rn j g(p) < +1g;
argmin g = fp 2 Rn j g(p)  g(q) (8q 2 Rn)g:
A polyhedral convex function g is said to be polyhedral L\-convex if for every
p; q 2 dom g and every nonnegative  2 R+, it holds that
g(p) + g(q)  g((p+ 1) ^ q) + g(p _ (q   1)); (3.1)
where 1 = (1; 1; : : : ; 1)>, and for p; q 2 Rn, p^q and p_q denote, respectively,
the vectors obtained by component-wise minimum and maximum of p and q.
The property (3.1) is called translation submodularity. By (3.1) with  = 0,
an L\-convex function g is a submodular function on Rn, i.e.,
g(p) + g(q)  g(p ^ q) + g(p _ q) (8p; q 2 dom g):
A polyhedral L\-convex function g : Rn ! R [ f+1g is called domain-
integral [11, p. 317] if argminfg(p)   p>x j p 2 dom gg is an integral poly-
hedron for every x 2 Rn with argminfg(p)   p>x j p 2 dom gg 6= ;. It is
known that domain-integral polyhedral L\-convex functions are closed under
addition.
Proposition 3.1 ([21]). The sum of (two or more) domain-integral poly-
hedral L\-convex functions is also a domain-integral polyhedral L\-convex
function.
We note that by the denition of domain-integral polyhedral L\-convex
function, the minimization of a domain-integral polyhedral L\-convex func-
tion g : Rn ! R [ f+1g can be reduced to the minimization of g on the
integer lattice points Zn. It is easy to see that the restriction of g on the
integer lattice points Zn satises the inequality (3.1) for every p; q 2 Zn
and every  2 Z+. In general, a function g : Zn ! R [ f+1g is called an
L\-convex function if it satises the inequality (3.1) for every p; q 2 Zn and
every  2 Z+.
The following conjugacy relation holds between M\-concavity and L\-
convexity.
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Proposition 3.2 ([21]). Let f : [0; u]Z ! R be a function.
(i) f is an M\-concave function if and only if the function g : Rn ! R
dened by
g(p) = maxff(x)  p>x j x 2 [0; u]Zg (p 2 Rn) (3.2)
is a polyhedral L\-convex function.
(ii) f is an integer-valued M\-concave function if and only if g is a domain-
integral polyhedral L\-convex function such that g(p) is an integer for every
p 2 Zn.
3.2. Minimization Algorithms.
We consider minimization of an L\-convex function g : Zn ! R [ f+1g
dened on the integer lattice points. We denote
dom Zg = fp 2 Zn j g(p) < +1g;
argminZg = fp 2 Zn j g(p)  g(q) (8q 2 Zn)g:
To the end of this section we assume that argminZ g is nonempty and
bounded. It is known that under such assumptions, argminZ g has the
uniquely determined minimal and maximal elements, which we denote by
q and q, i.e.,
q = the (uniquely determined) minimal minimizer of g;
q = the (uniquely determined) maximal minimizer of g:
This minimization problem can be solved by certain greedy (or steepest
descent) algorithms [22]. We rst consider a greedy algorithm such that
the vector p is always increased. For X  N , we denote by X 2 f0; 1gn
the characteristic vector of X, i.e., X(i) = 1 if i 2 X and X(i) = 0 if
i 2 N nX.
Algorithm GreedyUp
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 domZ g satises p  q for some
minimizer q of g.
Step 1: Find a minimizer X  N of g(p+ X).
Step 2: If X = ;, then output p and stop.
Step 3: Set p := p+ X and go to Step 1.
A tight bound of the number of iterations of GreedyUp is known.
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Proposition 3.3 ([24, Theorem 1.3]). The algorithm GreedyUp termi-
nates by outputting a minimizer q of g, and the number of updates of p is
exactly equal to kq   pk1.
Proof. Theorem 1.3 in [24] implies that GreedyUp outputs a minimizer of
g exactly in kq pk1+1 iterations. Since the last iteration in GreedyUp
is used to check the optimality of p and does not update p itself, the number
of updates of p is equal to kq   pk1.
We note that the vector q found by GreedyUp satises
kq   pk1 = minfkp   pk1 j p 2 argminZg; p  pg:
Hence, Proposition 3.3 shows that the trajectory of the vector p generated
by GreedyUp is the \shortest" path between the initial vector p and the
found minimizer q of g.
To nd the minimal minimizer q of g, a variant of GreedyUp called
GreedyUpMinimal is considered, where Step 0 and Step 1 in GreedyUp
are replaced with the following:
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 domZ g satises p  q.
Step 1: Find the minimal minimizer X  N of g(p+ X).
That is, a minimal X is found in Step 1, which is uniquely determined by
the L\-convexity of g. GreedyUpMinimal outputs the minimal minimizer
q of g, as shown in the following proposition. In addition, a tight bound of
the number of iterations can be given. Proofs of Propositions 3.4, 3.5, 3.6,
and 3.7 are given at the end of this section.
Proposition 3.4. The algorithm GreedyUpMinimal terminates by out-
putting the minimal minimizer q of g, and the number of updates of p is
exactly equal to kq   pk1.
We consider another variant ofGreedyUp calledGreedyUpMaximal,
where Step 0 and Step 1 in GreedyUp are replaced with the following:
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 domZ g satises p  q.
Step 1: Find the maximal minimizer X  N of g(p+ X).
That is, a maximal X is found in Step 1 instead of a minimal X, where a
maximal minimizer X  N of g(p+ X) is uniquely determined by the L\-
convexity of g. This modication makes it possible to output the maximal
minimizer of g instead of the minimal one.
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Proposition 3.5. The algorithm GreedyUpMaximal terminates by out-
putting the maximal minimizer q of g, and the number of updates of p is
exactly equal to kq   pk1.
Symmetrically, we can consider algorithmsGreedyDownMaximal and
GreedyDownMinimal, where the vector p is always decreased. Due to the
L\-convexity of g, minimal and maximal minimizers X  N of g(p X) in
Step 1 are uniquely determined.
Algorithm GreedyDownMaximal
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 domZ g satises p  q.
Step 1: Find the minimal minimizer X  N of g(p  X).
Step 2: If X = ;, then output p and stop.
Step 3: Set p := p  X and go to Step 1.
Proposition 3.6. The algorithm GreedyDownMaximal terminates by
outputting the maximal minimizer q of g, and the number of updates of p
is exactly equal to kq   pk1.
The algorithmGreedyDownMinimal is the one obtained fromGreedy-
DownMaximal by replacing Step 0 and Step 1 with the following:
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 domZ g satises p  q.
Step 1: Find the maximal minimizer X  N of g(p  X).
Proposition 3.7. The algorithm GreedyDownMinimal terminates by
outputting the minimal minimizer q of g, and the number of updates of p
is exactly equal to kq   pk1.
Proof of Propositions 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7. We rst prove Proposition 3.4.
The behavior of GreedyUpMinimal applied to g is the same as that of
GreedyUp applied to the L\-convex function g"(p) = g(p)+"
Pn
i=1 p(i) with
a suciently small positive ". Indeed, we have the following equivalences:
X  N is a minimizer of g"(p+ X)
() X is the minimal minimizer of g(p+ X);
p 2 Zn+ is a minimizer of g"
() p is the minimal minimizer of g:
This fact, together with Proposition 3.3, implies the claim of Proposition
3.4.
The proof Proposition 3.5 is quite similar to that for Proposition 3.4,
where the function g"(p) = g(p)  "Pni=1 p(i) is used instead of g".
Finally, Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 follow immediately from Propositions
3.4 and 3.5, respectively, applied to the L\-convex function g^(p) = g( p).
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4. Analysis of Iterative Auctions
In this section, we analyze the number of iterations of several iterative
auction algorithms for nding an integral equilibrium price vector.
4.1. L\-convexity of Lyapunov Function
We prove L\-convexity of the indirect utility functions and the Lyapunov
function. This observation plays a key role in the analysis of iterative auc-
tions. We rst note the equivalence between the SGS condition and M\-
concavity.
Theorem 4.1. A function f : [0; u]Z ! Z satises the SGS condition if and
only if it is M\-concave.
This theorem can be shown as follows. By denition, the SGS condition
for a function f : [0; u]Z ! Z is equivalent to the GS condition for ~f :
f0; 1g ~N ! Z given by (2.4). We can also show the following.
Proposition 4.2. A function f : [0; u]Z ! Z is M\-concave if and only if
the function ~f : f0; 1g ~N ! Z dened by (2.4) is M\-concave.
The proof is rather straightforward and therefore omitted. By Theorem 2.2,
the function ~f : f0; 1g ~N ! Z satises the GS condition if and only if it is an
M\-concave function. A combination of this fact with Proposition 4.2 yields
Theorem 4.1.
We then prove that L\-convexity of the indirect utility function is equiv-
alent to the SGS condition of a valuation function.
Theorem 4.3. Let Vj : Rn ! R be the indirect utility function associated
with the valuation function fj given by (2.1).
(i) fj satises the condition (A1) (i.e., fj satises the SGS condition) if and
only if Vj is a polyhedral L
\-convex function.
(ii) fj satises the conditions (A1) and (A2) if and only if Vj is a domain-
integral polyhedral L\-convex function such that Vj(p) is an integer for every
p 2 Zn.
Proof. By Theorem 4.1, the SGS condition and M\-concavity is equivalent
for fj . This fact, combined with Proposition 3.2, implies the claims of the
theorem.
Corollary 4.4. Suppose that all bidders' valuation functions fj (j = 1; 2; : : : ;m)
satisfy the conditions (A1) and (A2). Then, the Lyapunov function L : Rn !
R in (2.5) is a domain-integral polyhedral L\-convex function such that L(p)
13
is an integer for every p 2 Zn. In particular, the minimal and maximal
minimizers of the Lyapunov function L are integral vectors.
Proof. The claim follows from Theorem 4.3 and Proposition 3.1.
On the basis of Corollary 4.4, we regard the Lyapunov function L, orig-
inally dened on Rn, as a function on Zn. That is, the Lyapunov function
L : Zn ! R is an L\-convex function.
We denote by p (resp., p) the (uniquely determined) minimal (resp.,
maximal) integral equilibrium price vector. In the following proposition we
give an interval in which p and p are guaranteed to exist. Dene a 2 Zn+
by
a(i) = max
j2M
ffj(i)  fj(0)g (i 2 N): (4.1)
Proposition 4.5. Suppose that all bidders' valuation functions fj (j =
1; 2; : : : ;m) dened on [0; u]Z satisfy the conditions (A0) and (A1). Then,
every equilibrium price vector p 2 Rn satises 0  p  a.
The proof is outlined in Section 4.4.1.
4.2. Ascending and Descending Auction Algorithms
We rst consider the ascending auction algorithm of Ausubel [4], which
can be described as follows:
Algorithm AscendMinimal
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 Zn satises p  p (e.g., p = 0).
Step 1: Find the minimal minimizer X  N of L(p+ X).
Step 2: If X = ;, then output p and stop.
Step 3: Set p := p+ X and go to Step 1.
Note that the algorithm AscendMinimal can be interpreted in auction
terms as follows (see [4, Appendix B] for details about the implementation
of Steps 2 and 3):
Step 0: The auctioneer sets p := p, where p 2 Zn satises p  p.
Step 1: The auctioneer asks the bidders to report their demand sets Dj(p)
(j 2M), and nds the minimal minimizer X  N of L(p+ X).
Step 2: The auctioneer checks if X = ;; if X = ; holds, then the auctioneer
reports p as the nal price vector and stop.
Step 3: The auctioneer sets p := p+ X and returns to Step 1.
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Theorem 4.6 ([4]). Starting from an integral vector p with p  p, the
algorithm AscendMinimal outputs the minimal integral equilibrium price
vector p in a nite number of iterations.
The exact bound for the number of iterations in AscendMinimal is
given in terms of the `1-distance between the initial price vector and the
minimal equilibrium price vector p.
Theorem 4.7. Suppose that the algorithm AscendMinimal starts from an
integral vector p with p  p. Then, the number of updates of the price
vector is exactly equal to kp   pk1.
Proof. The Lyapunov function L is an L\-convex function by Corollary 4.4,
and the algorithm AscendMinimal is nothing but the application of the
algorithm GreedyUpMinimal to L. Hence, Proposition 3.4 implies that
AscendMinimal outputs the minimal integral minimizer qof L, which is
the minimal integral equilibrium price vector p by Theorem 2.3 (i). More-
over, the number of updates of the price vector in AscendMinimal is equal
to kq   pk1 = kp   pk1.
Note that any algorithm that increases the price vector by a 0-1 vector in
each iteration requires updates of the price vector at least kp pk1 times.
Hence, the algorithm AscendMinimal is the fastest among all iterative
auction algorithms of this type, and the trajectory of the price vector is a
\shortest" path from the initial vector p to the minimal equilibrium p.
In addition, since kp pk1  maxi2Nfa(i) p(i)g by Proposition 4.5,
we can guarantee that the number of updates of p is at most maxi2Nfa(i) 
p(i)g; note that this bound can be computed in advance before executing
the algorithm.
To nd the maximal equilibrium price vector p instead of the mini-
mal one, we consider another variant of the ascending auction algorithm
called AscendMaximal, where Step 0 and Step 1 in AscendMinimal are
replaced with the following:
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 Zn satises p  p (e.g., p = 0).
Step 1: Find the maximal minimizer X  N of L(p+ X).
That is, a maximal X is found in Step 1 instead of a minimal X. This mod-
ication makes it possible to output the maximal equilibrium price vector
p.
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Theorem 4.8. If the initial vector p in the algorithm AscendMaximal
satises p  p, the algorithm outputs p and the number of updates of the
price vector is exactly equal to kp   pk1.
Similarly to AscendMinimal and AscendMaximal, we can consider
two variants of the descending auction algorithm called DescendMaximal
and DescendMinimal, where the price vector is decreased by a 0-1 vector.
Note that the algorithm DescendMaximal is the same as the descending
auction algorithm in Ausubel [4].
Algorithm DescendMaximal
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 Zn satises p  p (e.g., p = a with a 2 Zn
given by (4.1)).
Step 1: Find the minimal minimizer X  N of L(p  X).
Step 2: If X = ;, then output p and stop.
Step 3: Set p := p  X and go to Step 1.
Theorem 4.9 ([4]). Starting from an integral vector p with p  p, the
algorithm DescendMaximal outputs p in a nite number of iterations.
The algorithm DescendMinimal is obtained from DescendMaximal
by replacing Step 0 and Step 1 with the following:
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 Zn satises p  p (e.g., p = a
with a 2 Zn given by (4.1)).
Step 1: Find the maximal minimizer X  N of L(p  X).
The algorithms DescendMaximal and DescendMinimal are noth-
ing but the application of the algorithms GreedyDownMaximal and
GreedyDownMinimal to the Lyapunov function. Hence, the next the-
orems follow from Propositions 3.6 and 3.7.
Theorem 4.10. If the initial vector p in the algorithm DescendMaximal
satises p  p, the algorithm outputs p and the number of updates of the
price vector is exactly equal to kp   pk1.
Theorem 4.11. If the initial vector p in the algorithm DescendMinimal
satises p  p, the algorithm outputs p and the number of updates of the
price vector is exactly equal to kp   pk1.
16
4.3. Two-Phase Auction Algorithms
An advantage of ascending and descending auction algorithms is that the
price vector is updated monotonically, which is an important property from
the viewpoint of auctions. They, however, have a drawback that the initial
price vector should be a lower or upper bound for the integral equilibrium
price vector p (or p). In contrast, the following algorithms, which we call
the two-phase auction algorithms, can start with any initial price vector and
nd an equilibrium. Therefore, the number of iterations can be small if we
can choose an initial vector that is close to an equilibrium.
As we see below, a two-phase auction algorithm is an application of an
ascending auction algorithm with an arbitrary initial vector, followed by a
descending auction algorithm. We rst present a variant of the two-phase
auction algorithm obtained from the combination of AscendMinimal and
DescendMinimal, which always outputs the minimal equilibrium price
vector p
Algorithm TwoPhaseMinMin
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 Zn is any vector (to be chosen appropriately
in practice). Go to Ascending Phase.
Ascending Phase:
Step A1: Find the minimal minimizer X  N of L(p+ X).
Step A2: If X = ;, then go to Descending Phase.
Step A3: Set p := p+ X and go to Step A1.
Descending Phase:
Step D1: Find the maximal minimizer X  N of L(p  X).
Step D2: If X = ;, then output p and stop.
Step D3: Set p := p  X and go to Step D1.
To analyze the number of iterations required by TwoPhaseMinMin,
we dene
(p; q) = kp  qk+1 + kp  qk 1 (p; q 2 Zn); (4.2)
where
kp qk+1 = max
i2N
max(0; p(i) q(i)); kp qk 1 = max
i2N
max(0; p(i)+q(i)):
The proof of the next theorem is given in Section 4.4.2.
Theorem 4.12. Starting from any integral vector p, the algorithm TwoPhaseM-
inMin terminates by outputting the minimal integral equilibrium price vector
p, and the number of updates of the price vector in the ascending phase is
at most (p; p) and that in the descending phase is at most 2(p; p).
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We can consider another variant of the two-phase auction algorithm,
to be called TwoPhaseMinMax, which is the combination of Ascend-
Minimal and DescendMaximal. That is, TwoPhaseMinMax is the
algorithm obtained by replacing Step D1 in TwoPhaseMinMin with the
following:
Step D1: Find the minimal minimizer X  N of L(p  X).
A version of the algorithm TwoPhaseMinMax specialized to valu-
ation functions on f0; 1gn coincides with the one in Sun and Yang [30].
TwoPhaseMinMax is also similar to the \global Walrasian ta^tonnement
algorithm" in Ausubel [4], which repeats ascending and descending phases
until some equilibrium p is found, where p is not necessarily equal to p
or p. Our analysis shows that the global Walrasian ta^tonnement algo-
rithm terminates after only one ascending phase and only one descending
phase; see also [30]. In other words, the behavior of the global Walrasian
ta^tonnement algorithm coincides with that of TwoPhaseMinMax.
Theorem 4.13. Starting from any integral vector p, the algorithm TwoPhaseM-
inMax terminates by outputting some integral equilibrium price vector p,
and the number of updates of the price vector in the ascending phase is at
most (p; p) and that in the descending phase is at most 2(p; p).
The proof of this theorem is given in Section 4.4.3.
Remark 4.14. We may also consider other two-phase auction algorithms
TwoPhaseMaxMin and TwoPhaseMaxMax. The former consists of
AscendMaximal and DescendMinimal, and the latter consists of As-
cendMaximal and DescendMaximal. It can be shown that TwoPhase-
MaxMin (resp., TwoPhaseMaxMax) nds the minimal integral equilib-
rium price vector p (resp., the maximal integral equilibrium price vector
p); the proof is similar to that for Theorem 4.12 and omitted. 
Remark 4.15. We point out that the iterative auction algorithms consid-
ered in this section use linear and anonymous pricing rule, meaning that the
price of any bundle x of goods is equal to p>x and is the same for all bidders.
On the other hand, so-called combinatorial auction algorithms use nonlinear
and discriminatory pricing rule, i.e., the price p(x; i) of a bundle x of goods
depends on x and bidder i and is nonlinear. It is shown that various iterative
auction algorithms using the latter pricing rule can be used to nd (possibly
nonlinear and discriminatory) equilibrium prices even if valuation functions
are more general than those with SGS condition (see, e.g., [9, Chapter 2]).
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Such iterative auction algorithms, however, are dicult to use in practice
since we need to deal with exponential number of prices. 
4.4. Proofs
4.4.1. Proof of Proposition 4.5.
Since all bidders' valuation functions fj (j = 1; 2; : : : ;m) satisfy the
condition (A1), they are M\-concave functions by Theorem 4.1. For the proof
of Proposition 4.5, we use the following property of M\-concave functions.
Lemma 4.16. Let f : [0; u]Z ! R be an M\-concave function. For x; y 2
[0; u]Z with x  y and i 2 N with y(i) < u(i), it holds that
f(x+ i)  f(x)  f(y + i)  f(y):
Proof. For y + i, x, and i 2 supp+((y + i)  x), (M\-EXC) implies that
f(y + i) + f(x)  f(y) + f(x+ i)
since supp ((y + i)  x) = ;. Hence, the claim of the lemma follows.
Let p 2 Rn be an equilibrium price vector. Let x1; x2; : : : ; xm be an
allocation such that x1 + x2 +   + xm = u and xj 2 Dj(p) for all j 2M .
We rst show that p(i)  0 for every i 2 N: Since x1(i) + x2(i) +   +
xm(i) = u(i) and xj0(i)  u(i) for all j0 2M , there exists some j 2M such
that xj (i) < u(i), which, together with x

j 2 Dj(p), implies that
fj(x

j )  (p)>xj  fj(xj + i)  (p)>(xj + i);
where xj + i 2 [0; u]Z. This inequality can be rewritten as
p(i)  fj(xj + i)  fj(xj )  0;
where the last inequality is by the monotonicity assumption (A0) for fj .
We then show that p(i)  a(i) for every i 2 N . Since x1(i) + x2(i) +
  +xm(i) = u(i) > 0 and xj0(i)  0 for all j0 2M , there exists some j 2M
such that xj (i) > 0, which, together with x

j 2 Dj(p), implies that
fj(x

j )  (p)>xj  fj(xj   i)  (p)>(xj   i);
where xj   i 2 [0; u]Z. This inequality can be rewritten as
p(i)  fj(xj )  fj(xj   i)  fj(i)  fj(0)  a(i);
where the second inequality is by Lemma 4.16 and the third by the denition
(4.1) of a(i).
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4.4.2. Proof of Theorem 4.12 for Algorithm TwoPhaseMinMin.
The key of the proof is the following property of L\-convex functions.
Recall that the Lyapunov function is regarded as a function dened on Zn.
Lemma 4.17 ([21, Theorem 7.7]). Let g : Zn ! R be an L\-convex function.
For every integral p; q 2 Zn with supp+(p  q) 6= ;, it holds that
g(p) + g(q)  g(p  X) + g(q + X);
where X = argmaxi2Nfp(i)  q(i)g.
We show several lemmas below, from which Theorem 4.12 follows. Let
p^ be the price vector at the end of the ascending phase and p be the out-
put of the algorithm. Recall that p denotes the (unique) minimal integral
equilibrium price vector, which is also the (unique) minimal minimizer of
the Lyapunov function L by Theorem 2.3.
Lemma 4.18. The vector p^ is the minimal vector in the set argminfL(p) j
p 2 Zn; p  pg and satises p^  p. In addition, the number of updates of
the price vector in the ascending phase is exactly equal to kp^  pk1.
Proof. The behavior of the ascending phase is the same as that of the algo-
rithm AscendMinimal applied to the function L^ : Zn ! R[f+1g dened
as
L^(p) =

L(p) (if p  p);
+1 (otherwise);
which is also an L\-convex function. Theorem 4.7 implies that in the ascend-
ing phase the number of updates of the price vector p is equal to kp^  pk1,
and p^ is the minimal minimizer of the function L^, i.e., p^ is the minimal
vector in argminfL(p) j p 2 Zn; p  pg.
We now prove p^  p. Assume, to the contrary, that p^ 6 p. Then, we
have supp+(p   p^) 6= ;, and therefore Lemma 4.17 implies that
L(p) + L(p^)  L(p   X) + L(p^+ X); (4.3)
where X = argmaxi2Nfp(i)   p^(i)g. Since p^ + X  p^  p and p^ 2
argminfL(p) j p 2 Zn; p  pg, we have L(p^ + X)  L(p^), which, to-
gether with (4.3), implies L(p   X)  L(p), i.e., p   X 2 argminZ L, a
contradiction to the fact that p is a minimal minimizer of L.
Lemma 4.19. kp^  pk1  (p; p).
20
Proof. If p  p, then p = p^ by Lemma 4.18. Since kp   pk1 = kp  
pk+1 and kp   pk 1 = 0, it holds that
kp^  pk1 = kp   pk1 = kp   pk+1 + kp   pk 1 = (p; p):
We then assume that supp+(p p) 6= ;. This implies supp+(p^ p) 6= ;.
Let X = argmaxi2Nfp^(i)  p(i)g.
Claim: mini2Xfp^(i)  p(i)g = 0.
[Proof of Claim] By Lemma 4.17, it holds that
L(p^) + L(p)  L(p^  X) + L(p + X): (4.4)
Since p is a minimizer of L, we have L(p+X)  L(p), which, combined
with (4.4), implies L(p^   X)  L(p^). From this inequality follows that
p^   X 6 p since p^ is the minimal vector in the set argminfL(p) j p 2
Zn; p  pg by Lemma 4.18. This concludes the proof since p^   X 6 p
holds if and only if mini2Xfp^(i)  p(i)g = 0. [End of Proof of Claim]
Let t 2 X be an element with p^(t) = p(t). Then, it holds that
p(t)  p(t) = p^(t)  p(t)
= max
i2N
fp^(i)  p(i)g
 max
i2N
fp(i)  p(i)g
 p(t)  p(t):
Hence, all the inequalities in this formula hold with equality. In particular,
we have
max
i2N
fp^(i)  p(i)g = max
i2N
fp(i)  p(i)g = kp   pk 1;
where the last equality is by supp+(p p) 6= ;. From this equation follows
that for every k 2 N , we have
p^(k)  p(k) = [p(k)  p(k)] + [p^(k)  p(k)]
 kp   pk+1 +max
i2N
fp^(i)  p(i)g
= kp   pk+1 + kp   pk 1 = (p; p):
Hence, kp^  pk1  (p; p) holds.
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Lemma 4.20. We have p = p. In addition, the number of updates of the
price vector in the descending phase is at most 2(p; p).
Proof. Since p^  p holds by Lemma 4.18, the behavior of the descending
phase is the same as that of the algorithm DescendMinimal applied to
function L with initial vector p^. Hence, Theorem 4.11 implies that p = p
and the number of updates of the price vector p in the descending phase is
equal to kp   p^k1. We have
kp   p^k1  kp   pk1 + kp   p^k1
 (p; p) + (p; p)
= 2(p; p);
where the last inequality is by (4.2) and Lemma 4.19.
Theorem 4.12 follows from Lemmas 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20 shown above.
4.4.3. Proof of Theorem 4.13 for Algorithm TwoPhaseMinMax.
Theorem 4.13 follows from Lemma 4.18 and Lemmas 4.21 and 4.22 below.
Recall that p here denotes the output of the algorithm TwoPhaseMin-
Max.
Lemma 4.21. The vector p is a minimizer of L and an integral equilibrium
price vector. In addition, the number of updates of the price vector in the
descending phase is at most (p; p) + kp   p^k1.
Proof. The behavior of the descending phase is the same as that of the
algorithm DescendMaximal applied to the function L : Zn ! R [ f+1g
dened as
L(p) =

L(p) (if p  p^);
+1 (otherwise);
which is also an L\-convex function. Theorem 4.10 implies that in the de-
scending phase the number of updates of the price vector p is equal to
kp  p^k1, and p is the maximal minimizer of the function L, i.e., p is the
maximal vector in argminfL(p) j p 2 Zn; p  p^g. Since p  p^ holds by
Lemma 4.18, we have
L(p) = minfL(p) j p 2 Zn; p  p^g = L(p);
i.e., p is a minimizer of L. By Theorem 2.3 (i), p is an equilibrium price
vector.
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We have
kp   p^k1  kp   pk1 + kp   p^k1  (p; p) + kp   p^k1;
where the second inequality is by (4.2).
Lemma 4.22. kp^  pk1  (p; p).
Proof. If p = p^, we have kp   pk1 = kp   pk+1 and kp   pk 1 = 0,
and therefore,
kp^  pk1 = kp   pk1 = kp   pk+1 + kp   pk 1 = (p; p):
If p 6= p^, we have supp+(p^  p) 6= ; since p  p^. The rest of the proof is
the same as that for Lemma 4.19, where p should be replaced with p.
5. Connection to Unit-Demand Auction
The unit-demand auction model, where each bidder is interested in get-
ting at most one item, is discussed extensively in the literature (see, e.g.,
[2, 3, 10, 18, 19, 28]). The model is known to be a special case of the
general model with gross substitutes valuations considered in the previous
sections. The objective of this section is to oer a unied treatment by
showing that the general algorithms AscendMinimal, DescendMinimal,
and TwoPhaseMinMin, when applied to the unit-demand auction model,
coincide with existing fundamental iterative auction algorithms for the unit-
demand auction model.
5.1. Unit-Demand Auction Model and Relationship with General Model
We explain the unit-demand auction model considered in this section,
and show the relationship with the general auction model discussed in the
previous sections.
The unit-demand auction model is a special case of the single-unit auc-
tion model, where each bidder is interested in getting at most one item, i.e.,
each bidder is a unit-demand bidder. This means that even if a bidder can
get multiple items, the bidder is interested in only one item.
As in the previous sections, we denote by N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng the set of
items and byM = f1; 2; : : : ;mg the set of bidders. We assume, without loss
of generality, that each type of item is available in only one unit. For each
item i and each bidder j, we denote by vj(i) 2 Z+ the valuation of item i
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by bidder j. We dene a valuation function fj : f0; 1gn ! Z+ of bidder j
by
fj(x) =

maxfvj(i) j i 2 supp+(x)g (if supp+(x) 6= ;);
0 (if supp+(x) = ;) (x 2 f0; 1g
n):
(5.1)
Through the one-to-one correspondence between 0-1 vectors and subsets of
N , we identify the valuation function fj in (5.1) dened on 0-1 vectors with
the following set function dened on subsets of N :
fj(X) =

maxfvj(i) j i 2 Xg (if X 6= ;);
0 (if X = ;): (5.2)
A valuation function of this form is often called a unit-demand valuation
(see, e.g., [9, Section 9.2.2] and [8, Denition 11.17]). It is easy to see that
the unit-demand valuation function fj in (5.1) satises the assumptions (A0)
(i.e., fj is monotone nondecreasing) and (A2) (i.e., fj takes integer values).
In addition, it is known that a unit-demand valuation is a typical example
of gross substitutes valuation, i.e., fj satises the assumption (A1).
Theorem 5.1 ([13]). Valuation function fj : f0; 1gn ! R given by (5.1)
satises the GS condition (and also the SGS condition).
Hence, the unit-demand auction model is a special case of the general model
with gross substitutes valuations discussed in the previous sections, and all
of the results there can be applied to the unit-demand auction model. To be
consistent with (5.2), we rewrite the denition of the demand set Dj(p) in
(2.2) associated with a valuation function fj in terms of set functions, i.e.,
Dj(p) = fX  N j fj(X)  p(X)  fj(Y )  p(Y ) (8Y  N)g;
where p(Y ) =
P
i2Y p(i) for Y  N .
Let N0 = N [f0g, where 0 denotes an articial item which has no value
(i.e., vj(0) = 0 for j 2 M) and is available in innite number of units. For
each bidder j and a price vector p 2 Rn+, we dene a set eDj(p) byeDj(p) = argmaxfvj(i)  p(i) j i 2 N0g
= fi 2 N0 j vj(i)  p(i)  vj(i0)  p(i0) (8i0 2 N0)g;
where we put p(0) = 0 for convenience. An assignment is a function  :
M ! N0, and an assignment  is said to be feasible if each item in N
appears at most once in f(j) j j 2 Mg (the articial item 0 may appear
more than once).
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A price vector p 2 Rn is said to be a Walrasian equilibrium price vector
if there exists a feasible assignment  : M ! N0 such that (j) 2 eDj(p)
for every j 2 M and p(i) = 0 for every item i 2 N n f(j) j j 2 Mg.
This denition of Walrasian equilibrium price vector is consistent with the
denition given in Introduction in the case of unit-demand auction model.
This fact, which seems to be well known among experts, is stated in the
following proposition, where a proof is given in Appendix for completeness.
Proposition 5.2. For a price vector p 2 Rn+, there exists a feasible assign-
ment  : M ! N0 such that (j) 2 eDj(p) for every j 2 M and p(i) = 0
for every i 2 N n f(j) j j 2 Mg if and only if there exists a partition
fX1; : : : ; Xmg of N such that Xj 2 Dj(p) (possibly Xj = ;) for every j 2M .
5.2. Review of Unit-Demand Auction Algorithms
In this section we review three iterative auction algorithms for the unit-
demand auction model: Vickrey{English auction by Demange et al. [10],
Vickrey{Dutch auction by Mishra and Parkes [18], and Vickrey{English{
Dutch auction by Andersson and Erlanson [3]. The description of the algo-
rithms given below basically follows [2] and [3]. In the following, we assume
that valuation vj(i) for bidder j and item i is given by a nonnegative integer;
this implies, in particular, that the valuation function fj for j 2 M is an
integer-valued function, and therefore there exists an integral equilibrium
price vector by Theorem 2.3 and Corollary 4.4.
For a price vector p 2 Rn+ and an item set Y  N , we dene
O(Y; p) = fj 2M j eDj(p)  Y g;
U(Y; p) = fj 2M j eDj(p) \ Y 6= ;g:
The set O(Y; p) consists of bidders who only demand items in Y at price p,
while U(Y; p) is the set of bidders who demand some item in Y at price p.
Obviously, O(Y; p)  U(Y; p).
A set Y  N is said to be overdemanded if jO(Y; p)j > jY j. This condi-
tion means that there exists at least one bidder in O(Y; p) who can get no
item in eDj(p) n f0g. A set X  N is said to be in excess demand at price p
if it satises
jU(Y; p) \O(X; p)j > jY j (; 6= 8Y  X):
This means that for every nonempty subset Y of X, there exists at least
one bidder in U(Y; p)\O(X; p) who cannot get an item in Y . The following
property of sets in excess demand is shown in [19, Proposition 1] (see also
[3, Proposition 1] and [2, Theorem 1]).
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Proposition 5.3. Sets in excess demand at price p are closed under union
operation, i.e., if X;Y  N are in excess demand at price p, then X [ Y
is also in excess demand at price p. In particular, a maximal set in excess
demand at price p is uniquely determined.
The Vickrey-English auction algorithm due to Mo et al. [19] and Sankaran
[28], which is a variant of the one in Demange et al. [10], is described as fol-
lows:
Algorithm Vickrey English
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 Zn+ satises p  p for the minimal
equilibrium price vector p (e.g., p = 0).
Step 1: Find the maximal set X  N in excess demand at price p.
Step 2: If X = ;, then output p and stop.
Step 3: Set p := p+ X and go to Step 1. 
To describe the Vickrey-Dutch auction algorithm, we need variants of
the sets eDj(p) and O(Y; p) by taking the positivity of prices (i.e., positive
or zero) into account as follows:
eD+j (p) = eDj(p) \ supp+(p) (j 2M);
O+(Y; p) = fj 2M j eD+j (p)  Y g:
A set X  N is said to be in positive excess demand at price p if it satises
X  supp+(p) and
jU(Y; p) \O+(X; p)j > jY j (; 6= 8Y  X):
The following proposition can be proved in a similar way.
Proposition 5.4 (cf. [3, Theorem 2]). Sets in positive excess demand at
price p are closed under union operation. In particular, a maximal set in
positive excess demand at price p is uniquely determined.
Vickrey{Dutch auction by Mishra and Parkes [18] is described as follows:
Algorithm Vickrey Dutch
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 Zn+ satises p  p for the minimal
equilibrium price vector p.
Step 1: Find the maximal set Z  N in positive excess demand at price p,
and put X = supp+(p) n Z.
Step 2: If X = ;, then output p and stop.
Step 3: Set p := p  X and go to Step 1. 
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Vickrey{English{Dutch auction by Andersson and Erlanson [3], which
is a combination of Vickrey{English auction and Vickrey{Dutch auction, is
described as follows.
Algorithm Vickrey English Dutch
Step 0: Set p := p, where p 2 Zn is any vector (to be chosen appropriately
in practice). Go to Step E1.
Step E1: Find the maximal set X  N in excess demand at price p.
Step E2: If X = ;, then go to Step D1.
Step E3: Set p := p+ X and go to Step E1.
Step D1: Find the maximal set Z  N in positive excess demand
at price p, and put X = supp+(p) n Z.
Step D2: If X = ;, then output p and stop.
Step D3: Set p := p  X and go to Step D1.
5.3. Analysis of Unit-Demand Auction Algorithms
We rst show that the unit-demand auction algorithms explained above
coincide with the iterative auction algorithms in Section 4 applied to valu-
ation functions fj given by (5.1).
Theorem 5.5. Let fj : f0; 1gn ! Z+ be valuation functions given by (5.1).
(i) The sequence of price vectors p generated by the algorithm Vickrey English
is the same as that of the algorithm AscendMinimal applied to valuation
functions fj.
(ii) The sequence of price vectors p generated by the algorithm Vickrey Dutch
is the same as that of the algorithm DescendMinimal applied to valuation
functions fj.
(iii) The sequence of price vectors p generated by the algorithm Vickrey English Dutch
is the same as that of the algorithm TwoPhaseMinMin applied to valuation
functions fj.
The crucial technical facts for the proof of Theorem 5.5 are the following
connections between sets in excess demand and the Lyapunov function L :
Zn+ ! R in (2.5) associated with valuation functions fj in (5.1).
Lemma 5.6. Let p 2 Zn+ be a price vector.
(i) A set X  N is the maximal set in excess demand at price p if and only
if X is the minimal minimizer of L(p+ X)  L(p).
(ii) A set Z  supp+(p) is the maximal set in positive excess demand at
price p if and only if X = supp+(p) n Z is the maximal minimizer of L(p 
X)  L(p).
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The proof of Lemma 5.6 is given in Section 5.4.
A combination of Theorem 5.5 above and Theorems 4.7, 4.11, and 4.12
in Section 4 yields the following (exact or upper) bounds on the number of
iterations in the unit-demand auction algorithms. The claims (i) and (ii)
given below are already shown in [3, Corollary 2], while (iii) is a new result.
Recall the denition of (p; q) in (4.2).
Corollary 5.7.
(i) The number of updates of the price vector in the algorithm Vickrey English
is exactly equal to kp   pk1.
(ii) The number of updates of the price vector in the algorithm Vickrey Dutch
is exactly equal to kp   pk1.
(iii) The number of updates of the price vector in the algorithm Vick-
rey English Dutch is at most 3(p; p).
5.4. Proof of Lemma 5.6
5.4.1. Proof of Lemma 5.6 (i).
We rst prove Lemma 5.6 (i).
Lemma 5.8. Let j 2M . For p 2 Zn+ and X  N , it holds that
L(p+ X)  L(p) = jXj   jO(X; p)j: (5.3)
Proof. We rst show the following equation:
Vj(p) = max
i2N0
fvj(i)  p(i)g: (5.4)
We have
Vj(p) = maxffj(X)  p(X) j X  Ng
 max [fj(;)  p(;);maxffj(fig)  p(fig) j i 2 Ng]
= max [vj(0)  p(0);maxfvj(i)  p(i) j i 2 Ng] = max
i2N0
fvj(i)  p(i)g:
On the other hand, for every nonempty X  N , we have vj(i)   p(i) 
fj(X)   p(X), where i 2 X is an item with vj(i) = fj(X). We also have
vj(0)  p(0) = fj(;)  p(;), from which follows that
Vj(p) = maxffj(X)  p(X) j X  Ng  max
i2N0
fvj(i)  p(i)g:
Hence, (5.4) holds.
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From (5.4) follows that
Vj(p+ X)  Vj(p) =
  1 (if j 2 O(X; p));
0 (otherwise):
Therefore, it holds that
L(p+ X)  L(p) = jXj+
mX
j=1
fVj(p+ X)  Vj(p)g = jXj   jO(X; p)j:
To establish a connection between the minimal minimizer of L(p+X) 
L(p) and the maximal set in excess demand, it is convenient to use a directed
graph G dened as follows. For a price vector p 2 Zn+, we consider a directed
graph G = (V;E) with the vertex set V = fs; tg [M [N0 and the edge set
E = f(s; j) j j 2Mg [ f(i; t) j i 2 N0g [ f(j; i) j j 2M; i 2 eDj(p)g:
For each edge (u; v) 2 E, we dene its capacity c(u; v) as
c(u; v) =

1 (if u = s and v 2M; or u 2 N and v = t);
+1 (otherwise):
Note that edge set E is dependent on price vector p. A vertex partition
(S; V n S) with s 2 S and t 2 V n S is called an s-t cut, and its the capacity
c(S; V n S) is dened as
c(S; V n S) =
X
(u;v)2E(S;V nS)
c(u; v);
where E(S; V nS) = f(u; v) 2 E j u 2 S; v 2 V nSg. An s-t cut of G is said
to be minimum if it has the minimum capacity among all s-t cuts.
For X  N , dene a vertex set K(X) by
K(X) = fsg [O(X; p) [X:
Note that (K(X); V nK(X)) is an s-t cut. The next lemma shows that the
capacity of (K(X); V nK(X)) minus m (= jM j) is equal to the right-hand
side of (5.3), and that a minimum s-t cut is given by (K(X); V nK(X)) for
some X.
29
Lemma 5.9. Let X  N .
(i) For every s-t cut (S; V n S) with S \M  O(X; p) and S \N0 = X, we
have
c(S; V n S) = jXj   jS \M j+m:
In particular, we have
c(K(X); V nK(X)) = jXj   jO(X; p)j+m:
(ii) For every s-t cut (S; V n S) with S 6= K(X) and S \N0 = X, it holds
that c(K(X); V nK(X)) < c(S; V n S).
Proof. We rst prove (i). By the denition of edge set E, there exists no
edge from O(X; p) = fj 2 M j eDj(p) nX = ;g to N0 nX. Hence, it holds
that
c(S; V n S) =
X
(u;t)2E; u2X
c(u; t) +
X
(s;v)2E; v2MnS
c(s; v)
= jXj+ jM n Sj
= jXj   jS \M j+m:
We then prove (ii). Suppose that there exists some j 2 S \M such thateDj(p) n X 6= ;. For i 2 eDj(p) n X, we have (j; i) 2 E and i 2 V n S, and
therefore
c(S; V n S)  c(j; i) = +1:
If there exists no j 2 S \M with eDj(p) nX 6= ;, we have S \M  O(X; p).
Moreover, S \M 6= O(X; p), since S 6= K(X). Using claim (i) above we
obtain that
c(S; V n S) = jXj   jS \M j+m
> jXj   jO(X; p)j+m
= c(K(X); V nK(X)):
It follows from Lemmas 5.8 and 5.9 that a set X  N is a minimizer of
the value L(p+ X)  L(p) if and only if (K(X); V nK(X)) is a minimum
s-t cut of the graph G.
Our next step is to relate minimal such X to the maximal set in excess
demand.
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Lemma 5.10. Let X  N be the (uniquely determined) minimal set such
that (K(X); V nK(X)) is a minimum s-t cut of the graph G. Then, X is
the maximal set in excess demand at price p.
Proof. We rst show that X is in excess demand at price p, i.e., jU(Y; p) \
O(X; p)j > jY j holds for every nonempty Y  X. Putting X 0 = X n Y and
Z = U(Y; p) \O(X; p), we have
jO(X 0; p)j = jO(X; p)j   jZj:
Hence, it follows that
c(K(X 0); V nK(X 0)) = jX 0j   jO(X 0; p)j+ jM j
= (jXj   jY j)  (jO(X; p)  jZj) + jM j
= c(K(X); V nK(X)) + (jZj   jY j);
where Lemma 5.9 (i) is used. Since (K(X); V n K(X)) is an s-t cut with
the minimum capacity and X 0 ( X, the minimality of X implies jZj > jY j.
Hence, X is in excess demand at price p.
To show that X is the unique maximal set among all sets in excess
demand, we assume, to the contrary, that there exists some set ~X ) X
in excess demand (cf. Proposition 5.3). Since ~X is in excess demand and
~X nX 6= ;, it holds that
jU( ~X nX; p) \O( ~X; p)j > j ~X nXj:
Putting Z 0 = U( ~X nX; p) \ O( ~X; p), we also have O(X; p) = O( ~X; p) n Z 0.
Hence, it follows that
c(K( ~X); V nK( ~X)) = j ~Xj   jO( ~X; p)j+ jM j
= (jXj+ j ~X nXj)  (jO(X; p)j+ jZ 0j) + jM j
< jXj   jO(X; p)j+ jM j = c(K(X); V nK(X));
a contradiction to the fact that (K(X); V nK(X)) is a minimum s-t cut of G.
Therefore, X is the unique maximal set among all sets in excess demand.
From the discussion above, we see that a set X  N is the minimal
minimizer of the value L(p+X) L(p) if and only if X is the maximal set
in excess demand at price p. Thus, Lemma 5.6 (i) holds.
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5.4.2. Proof of Lemma 5.6 (ii).
The proof of Lemma 5.6 (ii) given below is similar to that for Lemma 5.6 (i).
Lemma 5.11. Let j 2M . For p 2 Zn+, Z  supp+(p), and X = supp+(p)n
Z, it holds that
L(p  X)  L(p) =  jXj   jO+(supp+(p) nX; p)j+ jM j (5.5)
= jZj   jO+(Z; p)j   jsupp+(p)j+ jM j: (5.6)
Proof. We have Vj(p) = maxi2N0fvj(i)  p(i)g by (5.4). Therefore, it holds
that
Vj(p  X)  Vj(p) =

+1 (if eD+j (p) \X 6= ;);
0 (otherwise);
from which follows that
L(p  X)  L(p) =  jXj+
mX
j=1
fVj(p  X)  Vj(p)g
=  jXj+ jfj 2M j eD+j (p) \X 6= ;gj
=  jXj+ jfj 2M j eD+j (p) 6 supp+(p) nXgj
=  jXj+ jM nO+(supp+(p) nX; p)j
=  jXj   jO+(supp+(p) nX; p)j+ jM j
= jZj   jO+(Z; p)j   jsupp+(p)j+ jM j:
This concludes the proof.
To relate the minimal minimizer X of L(p X) L(p) with the maximal
set in positive excess demand, we use a directed graph G+ = (V +; E+) with
the vertex set V + = fs; tg [M [ supp+(p) and the edge set
E+ = f(s; j) j j 2Mg [ f(i; t) j i 2 supp+(p)g [ f(j; i) j j 2M; i 2 eD+j (p)g:
That is, the graph G+ is a subgraph of the graph G dened in Section 5.4.1
obtained by removing vertices in N0 n supp+(p). We dene the capacity
c(u; v) for each edge (u; v) 2 E+ as in Section 5.4.1, i.e.,
c(u; v) =

1 (if u = s and v 2M; or u 2 supp+(p) and v = t);
+1 (otherwise):
For Z  N , a vertex set K+(Z) is dened by
K+(Z) = fsg [O+(Z; p) [ Z:
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Note that (K+(Z); V + nK+(Z)) is an s-t cut. The next lemma shows that
the capacity of (K+(Z); V +nK+(Z)) minus jsupp+(p)j is equal to the right-
hand sides of (5.5) and (5.6) with X = supp+(p) n Z, and that a minimum
s-t cut is given by (K+(Z); V + nK+(Z)) for some Z.
Lemma 5.12. Let Z  supp+(p).
(i) For every s-t cut (S; V +nS) with S\M  O+(Z; p) and S\supp+(p) = Z,
we have
c(S; V + n S) = jZj   jS \M j+m:
In particular, we have
c(K+(Z); V + nK+(Z)) = jZj   jO+(Z; p)j+m:
(ii) For every s-t cut (S; V + n S) with S 6= K+(Z) and S \ supp+(p) = Z,
it holds that c(K+(Z); V + nK+(Z)) < c(S; V + n S).
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as that for Lemma 5.9 and therefore
omitted.
It follows from Lemmas 5.11 and 5.12 that a set X  supp+(p) is a
minimizer of the value L(p X) L(p) if and only if (K+(Z); V + nK+(Z))
is a minimum s-t cut of the graph G+ for Z = supp+(p) nX.
Our next step is to relate minimal such Z to the maximal set in positive
excess demand.
Lemma 5.13. Let Z  N be the (uniquely determined) minimal set such
that (K(Z); V + nK(Z)) is a minimum s-t cut of the graph G+. Then, Z is
the maximal set in positive excess demand at price p.
Proof. The proof is quite similar to that for Lemma 5.10 and therefore omit-
ted.
From the discussion above, the following equivalence holds for X 
supp+(p) and Z = supp+(p) nX:
X is the maximal minimizer of the value L(p  X)  L(p)
() Z is the minimal set such that (K(Z); V + nK(Z)) is
a minimum s-t cut of the graph G+
() Z is the maximal set in positive excess demand at price p.
Thus, Lemma 5.6 (ii) holds.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 5.2
We rst prove the \if" part. Let p be a price vector, and suppose that
there exists a partition fX1; : : : ; Xmg of N such that Xj 2 Dj(p) (possibly
Xj = ;) for all j 2M .
Claim: For each j 2M , the following properties hold:
(i) The set Xj in the partition contains at most one item in supp
+(p).
(ii) If Xj \ supp+(p) 6= ;, then the unique item i in Xj \ supp+(p) satises
i 2 Xj \ eDj(p).
(iii) If Xj 6= ;, then Xj \ eDj(p) 6= ;.
(iv) If Xj = ;, then 0 2 eDj(p).
[Proof of Claim (i)] For i 2 Xj \ supp+(p), we have vj(i) = fj(Xj) since
otherwise (i.e., if vj(i) < fj(Xj)) we have
fj(Xj)  p(Xj) = fj(Xj n fig)  p(Xj) < fj(Xj n fig)  p(Xj n fig); (A.1)
a contradiction to the fact that Xj 2 Dj(p). If jXj \ supp+(p)j  2, then we
have fj(Xj n fig) = fj(Xj), and therefore the inequality (A.1) holds again,
a contradiction.
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[Proof of Claim (ii)] For the unique item i in Xj \ supp+(p) we have
vj(i
) = fj(Xj) and p(Xj) = p(i). Since Xj 2 Dj(p), it holds that
vj(i
)  p(i) = fj(Xj)  p(Xj)
 max[fj(;)  p(;);max
i2N
ffj(fig)  p(fig)g]
= max[vj(0)  p(0);max
i2N
fvj(i)  p(i)g]: (A.2)
Hence i 2 eDj(p).
[Proof of Claim (iii)] By Claim (ii), we may assume Xj \supp+(p) = ;
with Xj 6= ;. Let i be an item in Xj with the maximum value of vj(i).
Then, we have vj(i
) = fj(Xj) and p(i) = p(Xj) = 0. Hence, the inequality
(A.2) holds again, i.e., i 2 eDj(p). This shows Xj \ eDj(p) 6= ;.
[Proof of Claim (iv)] If Xj = ;, then vj(0) p(0) = 0 = fj(Xj) p(Xj).
Hence, (iv) follows. [End of Claim]
Based on the claims above, we dene an assignment  : M ! N0 as
follows:
(j) =
8><>:
the unique item in Xj \ supp+(p) (if Xj \ supp+(p) 6= ;);
any item in Xj \ eDj(p) (if Xj \ supp+(p) = ; and Xj 6= ;);
0 (otherwise (i.e., if Xj = ;)):
We show that this assignment satises the conditions in the statement of
Proposition 5.2.
Since fX1; : : : ; Xmg is a partition of N and (j) 2 Xj holds whenever
(j) 6= 0, we have (j) 6= (j0) for every j; j0 2M with (j) 6= 0 and (j0) 6=
0. Hence, the assignment  is a feasible assignment. By Claims (ii), (iii),
and (iv), (j) 2 eDj(p) holds for all j 2M . Since each Xj contains at most
one item with positive price, we have p(i) = 0 for i 2 N n f(j) j j 2 Mg.
This concludes the proof of \if" part.
Next we prove the \only if" part of the statement. Assume that there
exists a feasible assignment  : M ! N0 such that (j) 2 eDj(p) for all
j 2M and p(i) = 0 for every item i 2 N n f(j) j j 2Mg. We may assume
that (j) 6= 0 for some j 2 M ; if (j) = 0 for all j 2 M , then we may set
(1) = 1 since v1(1)  0 = v1(0).
Let fX1; : : : ; Xmg be any partition of N satisfying the condition that
if (j) 6= 0 then (j) 2 Xj , if (j) = 0 then Xj = ;.
Since (j) 6= 0 for some j 2 M , such a partition exists. For j 2 M and
i 2 Xj n f(j)g, we have p(i) = 0.
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It remains to show that Xj 2 Dj(p) holds for each j 2 M . We rst
consider the case with (j) 6= 0. Since (j) 2 eDj(p) n f0g and p(i) = 0 for
i 2 Xj n f(j)g, we have
vj((j))  vj((j))  p((j))  vj(i)  p(i) = vj(i) (8i 2 Xj n f(j)g):
Hence, we have vj((j)) = fj(Xj) and p((j)) = p(Xj), which implies that
fj(Xj)  p(Xj) = vj((j))  p((j)):
For any nonempty Y  N , let i0 be an item in Y with vj(i0) = fj(Y ). Then,
it holds that
fj(Y )  p(Y ) = vj(i0)  p(Y )  vj(i0)  p(i0):
Therefore,
fj(Xj)  p(Xj) = vj((j))  p((j))  vj(i0)  p(i0) = fj(Y )  p(Y ):
We also have
fj(Xj)  p(Xj) = vj((j))  p((j))  vj(0)  p(0) = fj(;)  p(;):
Thus, Xj 2 Dj(p) holds.
We then consider the case with (j) = 0. We have 0 2 eDj(p) and
fj(;)  p(;) = 0 = vj(0)  p(0). Using this fact, we can prove fj(;)  p(;) 
fj(Y )   p(Y ) for all Y  N in a similar way as in the previous case. That
is, Xj = ; 2 Dj(p) holds.
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